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Abstract:
The paper is dedicated to the problem of flat ontology in philosophy 
and its relation to the practice in economy.  
The author argues that flat economy is based on a marginal 
utility theory of value and presents hierarchical value chains with 
concentration of power-capital as if they were flat and all the actors 
involved were equal. This is the work of democratic  
materialism, with its idea of radical equality of human and non-human 
interactions. This perspective, according to the author, should be 
opposed by the reconstruction of power-capital  
relations in unflat ontologies  
of the value-creation process.
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Introduction: Defining Flat Ontology  
and Democratic Materialism
In his book Absolute Recoil: Towards A New Foundation Of Dialecti-
cal Materialism, Slavoj Žižek (2015) writes that the current battles in 
philosophy are not between idealism and materialism, but between 
two versions of materialism: democratic and dialectical. While dem-
ocratic materialism includes a “vulgar” version of materialism “from 
scientist naturalism to the post-Deleuzian assertion of spiritualized 
‘vibrant’ matter,” dialectical materialism is:
…a materialism without matter, without the metaphysical notion 
of matter as a full substantial entity — in dialectical materialism, mat-
ter “disappears” in a set of purely formal relations. Second, despite be-
ing materialism without matter, it is not idealism without an idea — it 
is a materialism with an Idea, an assertion of the eternal Idea outside 
the space of idealism. In contrast to idealism, whose problem is how 
to explain temporal finite reality if our starting point is the eternal 
order of Ideas, materialism’s problem is how to explain the rise of an 
eternal Idea out of the activity of people caught in a finite historical 
situation. (Žižek 2015: 72–73)
This crucial theoretical distinction is very important when we 
are speaking about contemporary materialism. But what is exactly 
meant under the broad concept of “democratic materialism” and 
why exactly is it “democratic”?
Recent decades in social sciences have been marked by intense 
debates followed by the development of a bunch of concepts identi-
fied in different terms, purposes, and fields. Although this intellec-
tual movement does not have a singular indisputable designation, it 
identifies an important change in social sciences. Different theoret-
ical frameworks within this intellectual movement have identified 
themselves as “actor-network theory,” “speculative realism,” “tran-
scendental materialism,” “object-oriented ontology,” and so on. This 
broad metatheory is exactly what Žižek identified as “democratic 
materialism.” The term was adopted from Alain Badiou, who de-
scribed democratic materialism as a dual structure including a post-
modern materialist belief that there are “only bodies and languages” 
and a broad democratic recognition of the endless multitudes of 
“communities and cultures, colours and pigments, religions and re-
ligious orders, traditions and customs, disparate sexualities, public 
intimacies and the publicity of the intimate,” which should be recog-
nized and legally protected (Badiou 2005: 20–21). Although Badiou 
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mostly refers his critique to the postmodern liberal political concept 
of a “democracy of bodies,” the latter has a direct connection with 
democratic materialism in philosophy promising ultimate equality 
of all objects.
In this paper I want to develop an understanding of a substructure 
of democratic materialism rooted in the modern version of ma-
terialism that describes a democratic egalitarian relation between 
subjects and objects in terms of ontology. This specific version of 
a philosophy of reality interests me not because its democratic al-
legations are paralleled in politics, but because this doctrine se-
cretly indoctrinates the justification of global capitalism’s ruthless 
practices. It presents asymmetries and inequalities as a democratic 
platitude that coopts multitudes and objects in an endless dance of 
interactions and interrelations. I will call this doctrine “flat ontol-
ogy” and examine its implications using three key figures: Bruno 
Latour, Graham Harman, and Manuel DeLanda.
Ideology of Flat Ontology
The general direction of flat ontology’s development could be 
rooted in the so-called turn to things — an attempt to end the post-
modernist linguistic turn in sociology and revert the attention of 
social sciences from symbols to objects — and in the early 2000s 
developed into an “objective-oriented ontology” — a philosophical 
concept reestablishing the research field of philosophy. This rev-
olution particularly affected the notion of nature: many philoso-
phers and sociologists identified with the theory were calling for 
its redefinition and to transform the understanding of nature and 
matter in the social sciences. However, what interests me most is 
the ambition to create a new type of ontology.
The ontological turn is mainly based on the work of famous 
British mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead’s 
Science and the Modern World (1925), who criticized standard es-
sentialist “scientific cosmology” attributing identities and qualities 
to objects. Instead, he argued, matter itself is fluid and constantly 
changing. Bruno Latour developed this intellectual movement in 
the early 1990s with his book, We Have Never Been Modern (1993), 
proving that the Nature/Society (and thus subject/object) opposi-
tion that is always treated like an unquestioned methodological 
opposition in the social sciences is actually false. This led Latour to 
the establishment of a new approach in sociology — actor-network 
theory (ANT), which was later developed by Michel Callon and John 
Law. Initially ANT was set as an alternative to standard sociological 
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descriptions of reality mediated by semiotics. Although symbols 
are usually included in ANT, the pragmatic aspect of the theory 
referred to a more materialistic understanding of social reality. ANT 
argues with the traditional sociological division between subjects 
and objects in social reality and instead proposes to view social 
reality as an endless network of human and non-human actors that 
constantly constitute and reconstitute it. Social reality is in actions 
and connections, not in the essence of some kind of active subject 
and passive object. This was referred to by Latour as “flat ontology,” 
because this flexible structure led him to deny the prevalence of any 
particular actor or human subject. Later Latour introduced a concept 
of a “parliament of things,” proposing that the society needs to hear 
not only voices of humans but non-humans as well. These ideas 
built a solid theoretical foundation for the further development of 
democratic materialism.
Graham Harman is part of a fuzzy intellectual movement some-
times called “speculative realism.” In the 2000s, the ideas of White-
head and Latour were reinvented in philosophy in the works of 
Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman, Iain Hamilton Grant, and 
Raymond Brassier. Although there are major disagreements among 
these philosophers, they have a common enemy — a philosophical 
discourse that Meillassoux called correlationism. Correlationism, 
according to Meillassoux, is “the idea according to which we only 
ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and 
never to either term considered apart from the other” (2008: 5). This 
is the direct opposition to the Kantian rejection of the knowabili-
ty of a “thing-in-itself.” For Harman, this opposition is crucial for 
building his anti-idealist concept of reality.
To evoke Latour’s sociological theory to make this philosoph-
ical point work in social theory, Harman launched the project of 
object-oriented ontology (OOO), which is, in some sense, is also 
flat. In his book Immaterialism: Objects and Social Theory, Graham 
Harman (2016) considers any complex social system as an assem-
blage in which the most important thing is object-object relations. 
As an example, Graham uses the Dutch East India Company. He 
formulates fifteen rules on how the OOO should describe reality. 
The most important of Harman’s divergences with Latour is his 
replacement of the Latourian “actor” with the “object.” For him 
the most important thing is the existence of the object, not its 
activity or agency. OOO is flat in a sense that it denounces human 
exceptionalism and praise the realist approach according to which 
the only access we have is a direct access to reality in the form of 
objects. Objects for Harman are equally valuable and interrelated, 
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while hierarchies and taxonomies are artificial and obscure the 
true realist vision.
Manuel DeLanda made a move in different direction in his In-
tensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (2002), although his concept 
could also be described in terms of flat ontology. He was highly 
influenced by Gilles Deleuze, especially his work with Felix Guat-
tari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1983 [1972]). The 
Deleuzian project included a new conceptual framework with its 
own system mostly concentrated around a new form of materialism 
perceived as a constant production and differentiation in flows of 
matter. DeLanda uses this systematic framework to work it through 
flat ontology optics. The specifics of the Delandian view on social 
reality is determined by his concept of the “individual,” which plays 
in his theory the same role as the “actor” in Latour’s or “object” in 
Harman’s theories. According to DeLanda the general mistake of 
social theory was its descendant methodology, where the totality is 
described as a real existing entity and then analyzed and separated 
into smaller entities, up to the individual. He thinks that a better 
approach would include ascending from individuals to institutions, 
although he claims that the individuals are the only truly existing 
entities, while collective entities could only partially influence in-
dividuals (DeLanda 2017). DeLanda criticizes the essentialist ap-
proach to social reality with its distinction of broad organizations 
or institutions such as “market” or “state.” Instead he proposes to 
consider each social process as a flow of particular processes on the 
lowest (let me say even, the “flattest”) level of interaction. In other 
words, a Delandian research project assumes a certain level of meth-
odological individualization and deconstruction. DeLanda stands by 
a “flat ontology, one made exclusively of unique singular individu-
als, differing in spatio-temporal scale but not in ontological status” 
(2002: 47). Proving this, DeLanda does not hesitate to borrow his 
argumentation and examples from the natural sciences.
The reception of a Deleuzian ontology is highly visible in DeLan-
da’s denial of hierarchies driven by ideas stigmatized as manifesta-
tions of idealism. In one of his interviews with Guattari from 1995, 
Deleuze highlighted that
ideology has no importance whatsoever: what matters is not ideol-
ogy, not even the ‘economic-ideological’ distinction or opposition, but 
the *organization of power*. Because organization of power — that is, 
the manner in which desire is already in the economic, in which libido 
invests the economic — haunts the economic and nourishes political 
forms of repression. (Deleuze and Guattari 1995: 2)
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What Deleuze renounces here, in light of his ontology, is that 
ideas organize and drive social structure. The social structure itself 
is organized in a particular way through libidinal desire. Thus, the 
Deleuzian project rejects what is called “arborescent” thinking and 
proposes to transform it into a sort of “rhizomatic” perspective. It 
means that philosophy should reject the notion of totalities and 
replace it with assemblages. DeLanda adopts this view further, pro-
posing a “new philosophy of society” (2006: 1), probably the most 
detailed theory of how flat ontology should be implemented in our 
understanding of society. Delandian theory is based on the same 
rejection of ideas producing structures, he refuses to recognize to-
talities. For DeLanda, society is merely a collection of assemblages, 
manifesting itself in spatially particular interactions and through 
specific forms of coding that holds these assemblages together with 
a “stable identity.” This is indeed the philosophic version of Mar-
garet Thatcher’s infamous statement — the pearl in the crown of 
neoliberal wisdom: “there is no such thing as society.”
Although Latour, Harman, and DeLanda are very different, they 
are united, and what unites their systems of thought is precisely 
a flat ontology. Their interpretations of flat ontology are very dif-
ferent, but I think there are some core principles that could identi-
fy a common ground behind the flat-ontological discourse and its 
connection to democratic materialism.
First, their anti-idealism. The main target of critique here is any 
form of idealism, a belief in the essence of objects, “things-in-them-
selves.” This includes rejection of any forms of ideas driving social 
reality. For example, DeLanda denies the Hegelian (and Marxian) 
notion of totality. As a result, he denies the importance of what 
in critical tradition is called ideology, a system of ideas organized 
around social structures. And, as idealism leads to a certain hier-
archical taxonomy of objects and subjects based on their relation 
to idea, flat ontologists replace structure with some kind of inter-
related network or assemblage. Flat ontology proposes a vision in 
which every object is equal because there is no ideal organization 
of social reality (to which we have direct access) and thus ideas and 
ideology are irrelevant to it. Social reality is only produced by what 
is in reality (the actor for Latour; the object for Harman; individuals 
for DeLanda).
Second, this logic leads flat ontology to anti-anthropocentrism 
or non-humanism, the opposition to anthropocentrism — the central 
place given to the human subject in social sciences. The crucial point 
here is to give an opportunity for non-human actors or objects in 
order to recognize their role in producing reality. Latour (2004: 4) 
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calls this an “object-oriented democracy,” which is what is meant 
exactly by democratic materialism, as I have stated above.
When applied to social sciences, these principles would mean 
that: We don’t need broad concepts and totalities to understand 
reality. On the contrary, they prevent us from understanding it es-
tablishing erroneous vertical relations where there is only flat con-
nections; we need to resist illusions of idealism because they catch 
us into a false sense that we don’t have direct access to social reality 
but rather constantly try to interpret it based on the universe of 
the symbolic; we should repel the hubris of anthropocentrism and 
change our perspective in order to see how humans and non-humans 
are equal in producing reality.
According to classical social theory, we cannot make any judg-
ment on the true nature of objects but we could thoroughly describe 
its representation in a purely symbolic field (the postmodernist ap-
proach) or add to this description its social archeology or diagram 
(the Foucauldian approach). According to flat ontology, there are no 
things-in-themselves but also there are no “we” that can perceive it 
in the subject-object relation. Let me start with the first principle 
(and then we will logically come to the second one) in order to clarify 
problems in flat ontology’s relation to idealism.
Being essentially anti-idealist and thus anti-hierarchical, flat on-
tology disavows vertical connections and structures. “Flat” means 
exactly what it is: the power dimension is excluded altogether with 
ideas driving social reality. It seems like flat ontology uses Deleuzian 
materialism but at the same time purifies it from its critical potential.
Democratic materialism itself recognizes the problematic char-
acter of this rejection of ideas in flat ontology. Latour (2014) ex-
plains this in his article about materialism and technology: what we 
used to call “materialism” is in fact “idealistic materialism” because 
while we think we are materialists, in order to act in reality we use 
idealistic concept of real things. Latour explains how technology 
is used in a double sense: as an idea (plan or geometrical abstract 
scheme — écorché) and as a material object. Latour criticizes this 
idealistic materialism, although he confesses that social theory has 
not yet invented a “materialistic materialism” that could function 
as a viable alternative to the one described above.
This problem is crucial for flat ontology. In spite of its severe 
critique of idealism, flat ontology barely developed a strong materi-
alist version of (social) reality that could overtake the conventional 
philosophical perspective. Let me put it clearly: many alternative 
versions of social reality have been developed under democratic 
materialism, but none of it explained thoroughly how this reality 
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would function without the thing-in-itself. Rather, most developed 
versions of social reality are a good explanation of how reality does 
not work as an assemblage or network of dissociated objects. In 
other words, using flat ontology we cannot explain or make func-
tion what Latour (2014: 268) calls écorché: the schematic, idealistic 
model of constant chaos and entropy. With DeLanda’s version of flat 
ontology the problem is the same. Although, as I mentioned above, 
when he rewrote the Deleuzian version of materialistic ontology, he 
excluded from it a totality of “social machinery of Capital,” assuming 
that there is no axiomatic order behind the endless chaotic flow of 
individual actions.
This controversy might be explained through Žižek’s concept of 
ideology (1989). According to Žižek, modern ideology is an illusion 
within reality, which helps reality to function effectively. Žižek com-
pares this to the Freudian idea of the Unconscious. According to 
Žižek, a popular belief in ideology includes a trope about an ideo-
logical illusionary dream, which mystifies reality. When a subject is 
awakening, this dream disappears and he sees revealed reality, per 
se. Žižek argues with this belief, providing an alternative explana-
tion: the true uncovered reality is so traumatic that the subject has 
to fall asleep in an ideological dream. The Žižekian concept of ide-
ology is thus different from conventional understanding — it is not 
the distortion of reality that conceals the truth, but the reality itself 
is distorted in order to hide its traumatic nature: “The ideological is 
not the false consciousness of a (social) being but this being itself 
in so far as it is supported the false consciousness” (Žižek 1989: 
16). In this case, ideological illusion is a part of reality itself which 
helps it to function. Otherwise, our social world would have fallen 
apart because we will no longer be able to act in a social space. The 
exact reason why flat ontology denies any ideological order behind 
a reality is because it is ideologically driven.
What if the Latourian idealistic materialism is the perfect exam-
ple of a functioning of ideology unrecognized by democratic ma-
terialists themselves? And what if flat ontology’s call for opposing 
idealism and revealing the “truth” in the form of claiming that real-
ity being nothing more than multitudes of interacting objects with 
their independence from human agencies is the ultimate ideological 
demand for hiding the traces of ideology?
Žižek gives an elaborate critique of this problem using Graham 
Harman’s OOO as an example in his chapter of the book Reading 
Marx (Žižek, Ruda, and Hamza 2018). For him, the decentralized 
assemblage of objects cannot function without proper idealistic il-
lusion (“Spiritual Substance” for Hegel or the “Big Other” for Lacan). 
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Only in going through alienation in relation to the illusionary Idea, 
individuals make the “inexistent virtual order” real and thus make 
society function. We imagine that we live in a completely materialist 
world yet the illusion of the representation of objects is inscribed in 
the very social fabric of how we act. Could we at all act if something 
called “act,” as in democratic materialism, is now under suspicion as 
something that has no recognition for the multitude of non-human 
objects and actors?
This directs us to the second principle of flat ontology — anti-an-
thropocentrism. This is an essential part of flat ontology and its 
most important practical consequence — a non-humanist version 
of social reality. Flat ontology argues that the human is only one 
of the multitude of actors and phenomena that used to be treated 
as passive objects that also have agency and could become actors. 
This inhuman ethics require social theory to be sensitive to these 
non-humans and to include its agency into actual politics.
Latour (2011) developed this in his concept of “mononaturalism.” 
Latour thinks that the classic humanitarian opposition between 
“culture” and “nature” ended up, from the one side, in recognition 
of multiple views on culture (“multiculturalism”), from the other 
side, in the usurping by scientists the right to produce truth about 
nature (“mononaturalism”) and thus produce Nature itself. Yet his 
proposition is to introduce some kind of “multinaturalism” although 
it is not quite clear how this will function. But what is clear in La-
tour’s position — his demand for multiple natures to be constantly 
produced and created by different humans and non-humans in some 
form of materialistic democracy.
The most problematic thing here is the act of empowering 
the object itself. Is it not essentially ideological to proclaim that 
non-humans also have rights and their voices needed to be heard? 
Put differently, using the words of Žižek from which I started this 
paper, is flat ontology itself not illustrative of demonstrating how 
“the rise of an eternal Idea out of the activity of people caught in 
a finite historical situation”? Flat ontology as a theory is organized 
as a Latourian idealistic materialist structure, while the far-reaching 
political conclusions from it are already the embodiments of the 
Idea behind it — democratic materialism.
The best illustration of this thesis could be provided by recog-
nizing flat ontology as an already functioning Idea in reality. And 
the best example comes from an unexpected field of knowledge 
that has for decades already been demonstrating its adherence to 
principles of flat ontology without actually formulating them. Let 
us have a closer look at mainstream economics.
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Flat Economics: Unknown Knowns of 
Mainstream Economic Theory
As the intellectual storm went through the humanitarian scienc-
es, mainstream economics seemed to be untouched by these debates. 
This could be very easily explained by the kind of self-isolation from 
social sciences that was preached by economists claiming that eco-
nomics is not only closer to natural science than to social science 
(Nelson 2005: 261) but also by economics’ sense of superiority over 
any other social science. This position also reflects the ambitions of 
economics to become the social science, embracing into its research 
field every social problem.
Many economists not only truly believe this but also perceive 
most of the debates in sociology and philosophy as irrelevant to 
economics’ research fields. For many years, mainstream economists 
raised and solved its own problems without any concerns about its 
own philosophic fundamentals. Moreover, since the rise of neoliber-
alism, so-called economics imperialism (Stigler 1984: 311) claimed 
that all the problems of social sciences could be solved by economics’ 
methods and models.
I believe this happened because of the lack of self-reflexivity of 
economics itself. This could be explained using categories proposed 
in Philip Mirowski’s chapter devoted to defining neoliberalism in The 
Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Col-
lective (2009). According to Mirowski, there are two types of knowl-
edge as perceived by modern economic theory. First, about-society 
knowledge explains how capitalism and social reality work, while 
the second, in-society knowledge teaches individuals how to suc-
ceed and make money. About-society knowledge is appropriated by 
mainstream economics and normalized into common sense — and 
any theory that does not fit into this common sense is immediately 
stigmatized as useless or abstract or purely theoretical. In-society 
knowledge is supposed to be the only domain of useful scientific 
knowledge taught and considered in recognized economic estab-
lishments.
Using Žižek’s terms, this about-society knowledge of mainstream 
economics could be identified as “unknown knowns.” In 2004 the US 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave a speech about possible 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and addressed three types of 
danger: “there are known knowns; there are things we know we 
know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we 
know there are some things we do not know. But there are also 
unknown unknowns — the ones we don’t know we don’t know”(U. S. 
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Department of Defense 2002). Žižek, while analyzing this speech, 
added a fourth category — unknown knowns. He defined it as fol-
lows: “‘unknown knowns’ — the disavowed beliefs, suppositions and 
obscene practices we pretend not to know about, even though they 
form the background of our public values” (Žižek 2004).
So, what is so crucial in about-society knowledge or, let us say, the 
unknown knowns of mainstream economic theory? Pierre Rosanval-
lon (2008 [1979]) very convincingly formulates this as three funda-
mental beliefs of the “economic ideology”: every form of exchange 
is equal to market exchange; exchange is an archetype of any social 
relation; the economy is the practical realization of philosophy and 
politics. Consequently, the possibility of exchange is rooted in the 
very fabric of social reality, which is attributed with the concept of 
value. We only can exercise exchange if we can compare; we only 
can compare if we can evaluate using the same measure. Students 
of economics usually learn this in the form of the “myth of barter” 
(Humphrey 1985), which implies that some prehistoric primitive 
people exchanged one thing for the other and then invented mon-
ey in order to make it easier. Although many anthropologists argue 
that we have no evidence of this economic model in history, the 
myth itself reflects more an economics mentality than any particu-
lar historic reality. The idea of value is presented as the one that is 
deeply inscribed into social reality and thus very natural. The same 
goes for the process of evaluation and for exchange.
This is the very core of the unknown knowns of economics. And 
this is deeply connected with flat ontology’s first principle — the 
rejection of idealism. Do economics’ unknown knowns not reflect 
the Latourian idealistic materialism concept? Being ultimately ma-
terialist, mainstream economics does not recognize its own idealist 
materialism based on presupposed axioms about reality — that is, 
economics’ ideological stance. In the case of the unknown knowns 
of economics, we have the direct interpretation of reality hidden as 
common sense, something that was not properly questioned and was 
doubted for a long time by mainstream economics itself.
The common sense of economic theory — economics’ theory of 
social reality — is itself a version of flat ontology where actors/ob-
jects/individuals are those of the free market that interact in the 
constant process of market exchange and evaluation. Moreover, just 
like flat ontology in philosophy, this particular version of flat ontol-
ogy in economics has the same problem, which was outlined above 
using the definition by Latour — it has the same idealistic mate-
rialistic structure as the plan of the car in Latour’s example. The 
idea functioning here is different — it is the ideal type of exchange 
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that lie at the very core of each human interaction (the market). 
According to this common belief, the market is perfect (strong lib-
ertarian version), almost perfect (neoclassical) or the best possible 
(moderate Keynesian or behavioral economics’) model for social 
interaction. The aim of economic theory and practice is to bring 
existing social interaction in correspondence with this ideal type.
What is important here are the theories of value, which give the 
direct drive for a whole architecture of the conceptualization of re-
ality made by economics. Theory of value is traditionally the most 
philosophical part of economics and the approach to the question of 
value identifies the deep ideological stances of any particular eco-
nomic school. Two traditional explanations of how objects become 
valuable are traditionally rooted in different logics of explaining how 
objects become valuable. Labor Theory of Value (LTV) is one of the 
oldest concepts primarily proposed by Adam Smith and then devel-
oped by David Ricardo and Karl Marx. Italian economist Piero Sraf-
fa developed the modern neo-Ricardian version in 1960 in his book 
Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities (Sraffa 1960).
LTV claims that the value-creation process is rooted in the pro-
duction. An object’s value could be defined a certain amount of 
effort and other expenses put into it. When an object in the form 
of a product is sold on the market, its price is connected with these 
efforts and expenses. Sometimes it is the labor being acknowledged 
as the only source of the product value (the traditional orthodox 
Marxist version), sometimes economists consider some other factors 
of production to also be a source of value. This is the very important 
premise of LTV — it is concerned with the “natural value” of objects, 
of their “true” value. Unless we find this “true” value, we will never 
solve the problem of fair distribution of the results of production 
among workers and owners of capital. According to LTV, we could 
find out where the value is created and pay most of our attention 
to this target of increasing the well-being of society and rewarding 
those who work for it.
This was the original project of political economy and, at first 
glance, it was purely materialist. At least we could say it was mate-
rialist in how it was interpreted and transformed the leading econo-
mies at the beginning of the twentieth century. In practice, although 
mostly indirectly, LTV led to a Taylorist organization of production. 
If value is created through production, it is very important to mea-
sure it in order to control the whole economic cycle. The early Soviet 
project of the “scientific organization of labor” tried to do the same 
in the planned economy. At some point both projects, faced with an 
inability to find the true value behind new forms of labor, appeared 
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in the second half of the twentieth century. This is what Paolo Virno 
(2004: 22) called a problem of virtuosity: the irreducibility of some 
creative forms of labor to socially necessary labor time.
However, the ontological perspective here is not purely material-
istic and its failure in finding the true value of labor demonstrated it. 
Marx is traditionally misread in this context by the Marxist orthodoxy. 
Marx’s original idea is a dual characteristic of value as an essence 
and a value as a form. This is absolutely clear from the very begin-
ning of the first volume of Capital: Marx writes that commodities 
have a double form (Doppelform): a form that is natural or material 
(Naturalform) and a value-form (Wertform) (Marx 1890: 45). Thus, 
originally, value is divided into exchange-value and use-value. While 
the former is exactly true value (in material form, of course), the latter 
is the illusion of value created during economic exchange. The gap 
between exchange-value and use-value is the ontological reason for 
capitalism to emerge, because capital is built on the appropriation 
of the value (Wertform) emerging dialectically through this gap. The 
value (Wertform) arises from a natural form, but it is irreducible to it 
being social, immaterial and relational but at the same time objective.
What the main problem of the LTV  orthodoxy is supposing is 
that the use-value is a thing-in-itself that should be found in an 
attempt to solve the mystery of value. The truth is that by doing so 
they inverted Marx. Žižek argues that for many years Marxists and 
other supporters of LTV tried to find the essence (true value) behind 
the form while the true task was always to find the “enigmatic form 
itself” (Žižek 1989: 11): the problem was not to find the true value 
of Naturalform, but to disclose the work of social Wertform.
As the LTV fell into the heresy of idealist materialism and sank 
into meaningless attempts at finding the true value in the Natural-
form, it developed a very familiar picture: the idealist materialism 
version of reality with its endless search for Idea (true value). This is 
exactly why at some point LTV was rejected and replaced by a theory, 
which, at first glance, was (again) purely materialistic.
The marginal utility theory (MUT) of value was developed in order 
to oppose LTV and create a different perspective on the process of 
value generation. MUT by contrast to LTV claims that the value is 
created in the consumption rather than in the production. Customers 
willing to pay a certain amount of money on the market create de-
mand for a particular good. The price is a reflection of the (marginal 
utility) value of this particular good to the customer. Marx would have 
called this type of value “exchange-value,” but MUT rejects the dual 
character of value itself and thus repels the existence of “use-value” 
(or value in-itself). The value is created in constant interactions and 
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exchanges on the free market, driven by demand, and thus there is 
no “true” value besides the one that is created by market. It means 
that there are no “fair” wages or “fair” price for goods.
I dare to say that MUT is a version of postmodernism in economic 
theory. Just like postmodernism, it says that everything is relative, 
everything is identified through interrelation, symbols (money) and 
value is a kind of simulacra. MUT effectively shows its performative 
power on the markets where there are no clear definition of labor 
inputs and outputs, such as art, creative industry, and so on. For 
example, the painting of any particular modern artist is worth as 
much as rich purchasers are willing to give. The classic explanation 
in MUT is called the water-diamond paradox: in everyday life a dia-
mond is much more precious for you than a glass of water, but if you 
get lost in desert, the longer you wander the more you value water 
over diamonds. In other words, there is no true value in the essence 
of objects; it is always subjective and always identified by the market.
Although there were several attempts to revive LTV and oppose 
MUT, MUT has remained the dominant theory of value in main-
stream economics. And most importantly for me, it is also used in 
education and business in order to explain a process through which 
the economic value is gained.
For a naïve observer, MUT at least partly matches flat ontology’s 
conceptual apparatus. Supposedly, MUT is ultimately flat. Unlike 
LTV, which always had in mind an idea of value, MUT deals only with 
the value that is a result of interactions and interrelations — a price 
(what is called exchange-value in LTV). According to MUT, the de-
sires and actions of humans represented in the market create de-
mand that results in price. In addition, this price is a result of ex-
change, always understood, as we saw from Rosanvallon, as a form 
of market exchange between equal entities. This leads us to the 
following conclusion: in order to please customers, the value chain 
creates the product, which will be apprehened by them.
In MUT, the price seem to be a result of the networking of a mul-
titude of equal actors (let me in this case use the Latourian term), 
human (capitalists, workers, managers, customers) and non-human 
(nature, machines), which exchange what they had for what the oth-
er side desires. However, MUT is mostly referring to the formation 
of price — the external reflection of value. Usually MUT denies any 
internal (essential) dimension of value, but in this case the question 
of flatness inside the value-creation process is left unanswered. To 
explain this, MUT resorts to the help of the neoclassical theory of 
factors of production. Although factors of production are also used 
in Marxism and LTV, for MUT this theory substitutes LTV’s teaching 
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about labor primacy in creating value. Popular microeconomics’ 
version of the theory of factors of production explains that the 
input of capital and labor is proportional and thus they receive 
proportional reward for this input. According to this theory, this 
happens correspondingly to the principles of the flat economy be-
cause these relations perceived in input-output terms as if all the 
system of production is ultimately flat and involves no asymmetries 
in power and influence.
Economics flatten social reality by equalizing everything, trans-
forming every object and subject into exchange value, attributing 
price to everything. The understanding of the value-creation process 
is always peaceful and nonantagonistic: take, for example, the “tri-
ple bottom line” concept (Elkington 2018), a theoretical framework 
developed to identify the influence on “people, planet and profit”; 
or concept of “creating shared value” that defends a consistency of 
creating an economic and social value in business at the same time 
(Porter and Kramer 2006). All these theories are “flat” to the same 
extent as flat ontology. They always see social reality and interaction 
as an equally flat reasonable exchange.
Even if sometimes this exchange is to take place, in reality we al-
ways deal with the constant antagonism of different actors involved 
in value creation. Value creation reveals contradictions that we face 
in order to produce value, and most of this contradiction implies 
a zero-sum game. The beautiful fairytale of socially and ecologically 
responsible capital is mostly a lie.
What is missing in MUT and following a flat economy is a dimen-
sion that you cannot see from the flat perspective. This is a dimen-
sion of power, or, as it is in modern global capitalism — a dimension 
of capital. In order to substantiate my statement, I want to look at 
what is called in economics a value chain. The value chain covers 
the whole process of adding value to a product from extracting re-
sources from nature to selling a particular good to customer. In some 
sense, even the most choicely flat ontologist would agree that the 
complex value chain of modern interconnected capitalism is perfect 
assemblage or network, just like the Dutch East India Company from 
Harman’s analysis.
Power of the Value and Value of the Power:  
The iPhone Value Chain
In our global digital age, one almost perfect example of a value 
chain including many countries, entities, and firms in its complex 
network is the production of the iPhone. Although the full global 
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supply chain map is probably available only to the top management 
of Apple, Inc., there are some traces of how wide it has spread around 
a globe. What is particularly interesting is the fact that without 
the dimension of Capital (flat view); the iPhone value chain could 
be characterized by the postmodern notion of rhizome — a network 
without any identifiable center. In order to see the difference be-
tween an imaginary flat economy of equal actors and a social reality 
involving unequal actors subsequent to the logic of Capital, we 
should involve a critical unflat view.
One of the recently discovered traces lead us to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), a failed state in Sub-Saharan Africa. Here, 
in the hand-dug mines, workers, many of whom are children, extract 
cobalt, which is a crucial component in the lithium-ion batteries used 
in many electronic devices. Sometimes they sell it to the middlemen, 
sometimes companies claim they go to buy it directly from miners, 
which principally does not change the way cobalt is extracted. Main-
ly, as a 2016  report by Amnesty International revealed, the cobalt 
is bought by Congo Dongfang Mining, a wholly owned subsidiary 
of Chinese mineral giant Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, Ltd. Already on 
this level we see the unflat nature of what appears to be a network 
of market actors.
Amnesty International reported that 20  percent of the cobalt 
supply in the DRC comes from 110–150 thousand artisanal miners, 
who “mine by hand using the most basic tools to dig out rocks from 
tunnels deep underground” (Ibid). Many of the DRC’s families work 
in the artisanal cobalt industry having no other chance to make a liv-
ing. During Mobutu’s totalitarian political regime, the state-owned 
company La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines) was in 
charge of mining the copper and cobalt. After the EU multinational 
force and UN peacekeepers invaded the country in 2003 to stop the 
ongoing war, a transitional government was set up and the process 
of privatization started. Up to 2010, Gécamines was privatized and 
international companies got access to cobalt mining (The Carter 
Center 2017). Today, cobalt is extracted by big companies as well 
as by artisanal miners. The socioeconomic system built around co-
balt mining in the DRC  is enormous and involves a lot of people, 
organizations and entities, legal and illegal, national and global 
(Tsurukawa, Prakash, and Manhart 2011: 20).
It is important to remember that cobalt extraction and the bat-
teries assembled from them is only one of the dozens of particles 
used in modern electronics. The iPhone value chain involves many 
countries and many types of recourse, each of which is extract-
ed and processed in complicated multinational production chains.
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After all these components are produced, the next stage is as-
sembling. About half of all iPhones are produced in China, at the 
Foxconn factories. This is the final assembly stage, because many of 
the components are already semi-assembled. Foxconn is infamous 
for several cases of its workers’ death by suicide linked with low 
wages, overtime, and poor working conditions.
After the iPhone is assembled in one of these factories, it is 
transported to one of the many countries where the iPhone is dis-
tributed. In order to reduce taxes, Apple uses a strategy that includes 
purchasing a completed product from Foxconn and then reselling 
it to distributors. According to the New York Times, “[t]he process, 
most of which takes place electronically, allows Apple to assign 
a portion of its profits to an affiliate in Ireland, a tax-advantageous 
locale” (Barboza 2016). As for the iPhones produced for the inter-
nal market, they are still considered to be an import because the 
intellectual rights belong to Apple, although these phones are pro-
duced inside China, and, paradoxically, an iPhone could cost more 
in China then in the USA. In other countries, Apple use different 
strategies: sometimes there are official stores; sometimes it has 
contracts with official distributors.
What can the flat economy tell us about this value chain, the only 
one among many other value chains producing billions of products 
from trillions of different components? From the legal point of view 
and from the point of view of mainstream economics, there are multi-
ple equal agents involved in this process. The artisanal cobalt miners 
hold the same position of free-market actor as Apple, Inc., and at each 
stage there are direct and indirect exchanges between many such 
actors. Some are exchanging sources, some — their machinery, the 
others — their labor (human resources), while Apple “sells” the right 
to use their intellectual rights on design, hardware, and software.
The truth is that this value chain, just like any other, is marked 
by very complicated relations between political power, capital, na-
ture, law, workers, investors, international politicians, and so on. 
Only a naïve spectator could think that this chain of interaction 
from a mine through the intermediary buying raw cobalt, through 
the production and assembly to the distribution as a flat network 
of actors with equal potential. The visible flatness of this structure 
is already organized to bring the raw cobalt to life from its deep 
sleep in the ground with the force of Capital and then transform 
it to the electronic device in order to increase the flow of Capital 
itself. This unflat value chain is already a hierarchically fabricated 
desiring machine, which designates and controls a flow of resourc-
es, people, and money. The problem is that this machine of Capital 
30
Vadim Kvachev
presents itself, again, as the illusion of a network of equal actors 
making equal exchanges. But could we truly compare two mythical 
barter hunters possessing equal rights, and, for example, the CEO 
of Apple and a child miner in the DRC? The answer is no, although 
economically and legally they are, and this is one of the greatest 
hypocrisies of modern economics.
The key element ignored here by flat ontology is their ontic/onto-
logical difference. Flat ontology simplifies reality to one dimension, 
leaving unaddressed the dimension of Capital. However, how could 
we be so sure about this unflatness? We should use critical theory in 
order to reconstruct what this extra dimension of power would look 
like. For this purpose, we should become for a while idealist materi-
alist — not only in the Latourian sense, but also in the Žižekian: we 
should not blindly renounce the ideas in order to find “materialist 
materialism,” but rather see how ideology shapes the coordinates of 
reality. We need, as Frank Ruda (quoting Badiou) put it, “an idealism 
without idealism” (Ruda 2015: 87).
In order to look closely at the exemplary value chain I follow in 
this paper, I  want to use Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler’s 
concept of capital-power. In their book Capital as Power: A Study of 
Order and Creorder, they write: “Capital, we claim, is neither a mate-
rial object nor a social relationship embedded in material entities. It 
is not ‘augmented’ by power. It is, in itself, a symbolic representation 
of power” (Nitzan and Bichler 2009: 7). This power is measured, 
according to the authors, by capitalization, an ability to redefine 
everything (human beings, risks, nature, etc.) into future earnings. 
Using this power, capital becomes a mega-machine, assembled on 
an ideal and material level at the same time to reshape reality in 
all its levels. Capital constitutes a universal symbolic order based 
on capitalization; creates cohesion in form of a unifying belief in 
the normal rate of return; expands as an “ever increasing scale”, 
devouring social reality; intensifies, deepening the capitalist order 
into society; absorbs all the social relations in different spheres, 
rewriting it in its own terms of capitalization (Nitzan and Bichler 
2009: 270–71). The Capital mega-machine presents itself in terms 
of flat economy as a set of equal agents, while truly it is unflat be-
cause each of these agents has different powers to shape reality. And 
the design of capitalism determines that the “drive to accumulate 
is a drive for more power” (Nitzan, Bichler, and Dutkiewicz 2013).
Let us look at the power-capital of Apple in the value chain of 
the iPhone. The clearest identification of power-capital is an ability 
to create a profit margin. In 2018  the profit margin of the iPhone 
XS Max was estimated as 200 percent (the price of the iPhone was 
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$1249 USD and the costs only $443 USD); the iPhone X profit mar-
gin was estimated at 64 percent and the iPhone 8–59 percent. Flat 
economics would use MUT to say that this could be explained by the 
high demand of the iPhones by customers and the theory of factors 
of production to conclude that the profit margin is equal to the 
value added to iPhones by Apple’s fair and just intellectual input. 
Only an unflat ontology would help us see the power that iPhone’s 
profit margin represents: the power to control markets manifested 
in persuading customers that the iPhone is worth this price; the 
power to dictate its rules to suppliers such as Foxconn; the power to 
structure the whole value chain in order to make profit. For example, 
in 2015 Apple ended a contract with Imagination Technologies, the 
supplier of graphics processors. Imagination Technologies’ stock 
prices immediately dropped 70 percent.
The value appropriated, the value created, the value controlled is 
the measurement of the power of each agent in its unflat position 
in an economy. This power might be characterized by what Michel 
Feher (2015) called an ability to create credit: sustain and raise 
a certain value for shareholders.
This type of value is quite different from the ones that are ana-
lyzed in LTV and MUT. It is not related to the product as it is connect-
ed with the market value of shares of the company and thus with the 
attractiveness of the company for investors. Each company in terms 
of its shares’ value has a different ability to attract investments 
and this ability is not only dependent on the current value of these 
shares. Through the process of capitalization, investors evaluate fu-
ture possibilities of increasing value and, while investing, they hope 
for this increase to happen. This means that investors give credit 
for the future increase in value rather than evaluating the actual 
price of assets. Mainstream economics stands by an Effective Market 
Hypothesis (EMH), which claims that share prices reflect all current 
information. Nitzan and Bichler (2009: 192–96) showed that this is 
not entirely true, and the price of shares are highly dependent on 
the opinion of experts, market analysts, and strategists. It means 
that the value of a company is the credit given to this company by 
the collective consensus. And an ability to influence this consensus 
in order to increase or decrease the amount of credit given in a form 
of evaluation of its future price of shares is the power of Capital.
If we, as Latour wants, are to get rid of idealistic materialism in 
order to fully pledge our loyalty to flat ontology, we miss this unflat 
structure behind the illusion of flatness. We will think of economic 
agents in terms of economics textbooks and will go to the extreme 
of treating the CEO of a  huge corporation and cobalt miner as if 
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they were equal prehistoric hunters. We may think of flat econom-
ics, the moppet of flat ontology, as of mere form behind which we 
should find the true idea of capitalism — unflatness, concentration 
of power- capital. But, as Žižek puts it, “the form is never a ‘mere’ 
form, but involves a dynamic of its own which leaves traces in the 
materiality of social life” (Žižek 2007).
Democratic materialism proposes a  picture of reality where all 
objects and subjects are equal, where there is even no difference 
between object and subject. This flat picture is usually presented 
as something new and revolutionary in social science. But we have 
seen that the same flat vision has already been proposed by eco-
nomics, which equalized everything using a mainstream theory of 
value — without a highly intellectual doctrine, of course, but rather 
in practice, presenting value chains as networks. In both cases, flat 
theories ignore the dimension of power- capital and thus show us 
a unilateral picture of social reality. By using a critique and adding 
the dimension of power- capital, we also add an antagonism because 
unflatness presumes constant change and redistribution of asymme-
tries and balances in reality. And this is how dialectical materialism 
today should respond to democratic materialism: by pointing at 
unflatness in a presumably flat reality and identifying antagonisms 
driven by the idea inscribed in the “enigmatic form” itself.
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